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Growth has remained relatively high in Morocco, and inflation
subdued.  Morocco has made great progress toward macroeco-
nomic and fiscal stability, but the need remains for an unshaken
commitment to fiscal discipline, a determined effort to reformn
the tax and public spending systems, and a measured attempt to
make credit available for investment and to liberalize financial
markets.
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Morocco's  reccnt  cconomic  history  rcsemlblcs  Faini  argues  that  ;Iage moderation  an1d
those  of'mansv  At'rican  countries.  Morocco's  judicious  monetary  policies  were  instrumnental  in
economic  dilf'iculties  originated  in the  comiminod-  restrainiig  inflation.  Wilih a brief  exception  in
ity  (phosphate)  boom  of'tlic  mid-1970s,  which  1983,  monetary  autlhoNtics  remained  firmilv
coincidcd  with  1-isinig  govenmeint  spending  and  committed  to avoiding  inflationary  financing  of
an  unprecedented  expatnsion  of'public  invest-  the  budget  delicit,  But  this  sitrategy  could
ment  --  cndilg  Morocco's  earlier  liscal  conlser-  succeed  only  becausc  of  the  A ide-ranging  system
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phosphate  prices  and  thc  second  oil  shock-  relatively  low  cost.  But  the  prospects  for  conl-
prompted  Mor.  'o  to resort  increasingly  to  tinuing  such  a stratcey  are  not  f'avorable.
external  capital  markets  to  maintain  an  unabated
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of  trade  and  the  unexpected  rise  in international  includinig  a strinlg ol' record  agricultural  harvests
interest  rates,  together  with  thc  severe  droughlt  of'  and  thc  collapse  of' real  oil  prices.
1980-84,  croded  debt  service  capacity  and
precipitated  a major  forcign  exchange  crisis  in  Morocco  has  made  gr;eat pro-gress  towvard
1983.  macroeconomic  and  liscal  stability  but  the autlio
recommends:
In  response  to this  crisis,  Morocco  launchied
a medium-term  program  of  economic  rceform  and  *  An unshaken  commimntcii  to  Fiscal  disci-
introduced  comprehelisive  stabilization  and  pline.  Increa,sed  govermcint  spending  will
structural  adjustment  measures.  Since  1983,  probably  crowd  out  investment,  The  shor-m--un
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Morocco's  recent  economic  hlstory  bears  strlking  resemblances  with
the  one  oF many  countries  in  Africa.  The  origins  of Morocco's  economic
difficulties  can  be  traced  to  the  commodity  (phosphate)  boom  of  the  mild-
19 7 0's  which  coincided  wlth  rislng  government  expenditure  and  an
unprecedented  expanslon  of  the  public  investment  program  signallng  the
end  of  the  conservative  Fiscal  policies  of  the  past.  The  sudden  reversal
in  the  terms  of  trade  in  the  late  1970's  as  a  result  of  the  plunge  In
phosphate  prices  and  the  second  oil  shock  prompted  Morocco  to  resort
Increasingly  to  external  capital  markets  In order  to  malntaln  an unabated
level  of  public  expenditure.  However  the  continued  deterloratlon  of  the
terms  of  trade,  the  unanticipated  rise  in  International  Interest  rates
together  with  the  severe  drought  In  1980-84  eroded  debt  service
capacity  and  precipitated  a  major  foreign  exchange  crlsls  In  1983.  In
response  to  this  crisis,  Morocco  launched  a  medium-term  program  of
economic  reforms  and,  In  consultation  with  the  International  Monetary
Fund  and  the  World  Bank,  introduced  a  comprehensive  set  oF stabllizatlon
and  structural  adjustment  measures.  Since  1983  Morocco  has  made
great  progress  in  allevlating  both  Internal  and  external  disequllibria.
The  overall  budget  and  current  account  deficits  have  been  reduced  from
9% and  12% of GDP  in  1982  tc  4.5%  and  .4% respectlvely  In  1988.
There  are  several  interesting  features  In  Morocco's  adjustment
experience.  Despite  the  severity  of  the  crisls  and  the  size  of  the
adjustment  undertaken,  growth  has  remained  fairly  high,  at  least  In
relation  to  other  highly  indebted  countries,  and  inflatlon  subdued.  As
measured  by  the  CPI,  inflation  was  equal  to  6.2%  in  1983,  It  Increased
to  12.5%  in  1984  but  then  steadily  declined  to  reach  2.3%  in  1988.
During  the  same  period  real  GDP  growth  averaged  4.3%.  This
performance  seems  to  contradict  the  received  wisdom  that  large  budget
deficits  will  foster  inflation.  The  inFlation  record  Is  particularly
surprising  if  we  also  consider  that  Morocco  achieved  a  20%  real
depreciation  during  the  eighties.
In  this  paper  we  try  to  uncover  the  reasons  underlying  the
performance  oF  the  Moroccan  economy.  To  anticipate  our  concluslons,
we  argue  that  wage  moderation  and  judiclous  monetary  pollcies  were
instrumental  in  restraining  inflation.  Wlth  one  brief  exceptlon  ln  1983,
monetary  authorities  remained  firmly  committed  to  eschew  any2
inflationary  financing  of  the  budget  deficit.  This  strategy  could  only
succeed  however  because  of  the  wide  ranging  system  of  credit  and
monetary  regulations  which  worked  to  channel  domestic  funds  toward  the
Treasury  at  relatively  lov/  coEt.-.  The  prospects  for  the  continuation  of
such  strategy  are  not  favou-able  however.  As  far  as  the  growth
performance  is  concerned,  it  Eppears  that  it  can  be  attributed  to  an
outstanding  export  response  to  the  new  trade  regime  on  the  one  hand  and
a  set  of  favourable  supply,  s.ucks,  including  a  string  of  record
agricultural  harvests  and  the  collapse  of real  oil  prices,  on  the  other.
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we
study  the  evolution  of the  budget  and  of its  different  components.  We also
examine  how  the  deficit  was  financed.  In  section  3,  we  argue  that  the
reluctance  by  Morocco's  policy  makers  to  monetize  existing  budget
deficits  is  well  explained  by  the  sharply  unfavourable  trade-offs  between
higher  monetization  and  inflation  that  exist  in  Morocco.  Such
conclusions  are  based  on  the  estimation  of  a  system  of  assets  demand.
In  the  following  section,  we  analyse  the  implications  that  continuing
budgetary  disequilibria  entail  on  investment  and  saving  decisions.  We
find  that  such  implications  may  be substantial,  even  though  they  may  not
work  their  way  exclusively  through  traditional  interest  rates  channels.
Frinally  in  section  5,  we  assemble  the  various  pieces  of  econometric
evidence  collected  in  the  paper  to  study  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  in
the  context  of  a  macroeconometric  mGdel.  The  last  section  offers  some
conclusions.3
2.  THE BUDGET DEFICIT:  EVOLUTION  AND  FINANCING
a)  the  overaUl  trend
The  budget  situation  in  Morocco  registers  a  continuous  deterioration
during  the  second  half  of  the  seventies.  Sorme  timid  attempts  to
macroeconomic  stabilization  provide  only  temporary  restraint  to  the
burgeoning  financial  needs  of  the  Treasury.  However  at  the  beginning  of
the  eighties  the  fiscal  repercussions  of  the  fali  in  Morocco's  terms  of
trade,  the  increasing  burden  of  foreign  debt  attendart  on  the  steep  rise
oF  International  interest  rates  and  the  growing  weariness  of  foreign
commercial  banks  to  provide  continuing  financing'  to  the  Treasury  bring
to  the  forefront  the  issue  of  fiscal  responsabilit  y.  As  a  matter  of  fact
the  budget  deficit,  measured  on  a  cash-basis,  shows  a  slow  but  steady
decline  starting  in  1981.  After  increasing,  as  a  percent  of  GDP,  from
an  average  value  of  3.2%  in  1971-1974  to  153% in  1976-1981,  it
declines  to  8%  in  1984-5  and  appears  to  stabi]ize  around  5%  in  the
more  recent  years  (Table  1).
Cash-based  measures  of  the  budget  deficit  can  be  however  quite
misleading.  The  Treasury  may  indeed  resort  to  the  use  of  financial
arrears  to  cope  with  mounting  financial  difficulties.  This  Is  indeed  what
happened  in  Morocco  until  1985.  Because  cash-based  deficits  do  .ot
allow  for  the  accumulation  of  financial  arrears,  they  will  fail  to  refle
the  full  pressure  that  fiscal  policy  exerts  on  available  resources.
Conmersely,  cash-based  deficits  will  overestimate  the  size  of  the  fiscal
problem  whenever  financial  arrears  are  being  decumulated.  Notlce  in
this  respect  that,  after  1985,  adjustment  programs  in  Morocco  have
involved  a  sizeable  reduction  In the  stock  of  a-rears.  Overall,  It  Is  more
appropriate  to  treat  the  accumulation  of  arrears  as  a  source  of
(involuntary)  finance  and  measure  the  deficit  on  a  payment  order  basis.
If  this  is  done  for  Morocco,  the  deficit  plcture  changes  substantlally.
Both  the  initial  increase  and  the  subsequent  decline  in  the  budget  deflcit
are  more  substantial  when  measured  on  a  payment-order  basis  than  on  a
cash  basis  (Table  2).  This  is  simply  due  to  the  fact  that  arrears  had
been  accumulated  until  1985  and  decumulated  afterward.
A  further  correction  relates  to  interest  payments.  As  column  3  of
Table  2  shows,  the  latter  have  steadily  increased  as  a  share  of  GDP,
compounding  therefore  the  budget  difficulties.  Yet  allowance  should  be4
made  for  the  fact  that,  under  infltionary  conditlons,  a  pote,  allly
conspicuous  share  of Interest  payments  represents  early  amortiz,  on  of
outstandlng  debt  and,  as  such,  should  be  considered  as  a  (riegative)
financing  component.  For  Morocco,  historlcally  low  Inflation  rates  mean
that  thls  correction  is  not  going  to  produce  dramatic  effects.  Its  impact
Is  nonetheless  substantial,  albeit  declining.  From  column  4  of  Table  2,
we  can  see  that  capital  gaIns  on  domestic  debt  due  to  Inflation  were
equal  to  3.1%  of  GDP  in  1984.  Due  to  the  drop  In  Inflatlon,  they  then
declined  to  1.3%  In  1988.  As  a  Xesult  the  operatlonal  budget,  whlch
only  includes  real  interest  payments,  reglstered  a  relatively  modest
deficit  In  198x  and  a  surplus  in  1986.  We  have  also  corrected  for
valuation  effects  In  the  stock  of  foreign  debts,  by  multiplying  the
outstanding  stock  at  the  beginning  of  the  perlod  by  the  excess  of
domestic  Inflation  (measured  by  the  change  In  the  GDP  deflator)  over
the  rate  of  devaluatlon  (taken  with  respect  to  the  nomlnal  effectlve
exchange  rate).  We  feel  much  less  confident  about  this  correctlon
insofar  it  overlooks  valuatlon  changes  due  for  Instance  to  cross  currency
fluctuations  which  appear  to  have  played  a  substantlal  role  in
determlning  the  evolution  of  foreign  debt  indlcators  for  Morocco.  We
nonetheless  report  the  results  of  such  correction  (column  5).  Its  Impact
Is  baslcally  Inslgnlficant  in  1984,  but  grows  over  tlme  as  domestlc
Inflatlc  l  is  no  longer  matched  by  a  corresponding  devaluation.
The  last  measure  we  conslder  is  the  primary  deficit,  which  excludes
all  Interest  payments.  By  excluding  a  component  whlch  Is  to  a  large
extent  beyond  the  control  of  flscal  authorlties,  It  provldes  s  more
accurate  Indicator  of  the  effort  to  redress  exlstlng  fiscal  Imbalances.
The  evolutlon  of  the  prlmary  deficit  hlghlights  the  adjustment  effort  on
the  flscal  front.  The  primary  deficit  was  equal  to  7.2%  of  GDP  in  1983
a.nd has  steadlly  declined  since  then  to  reach  a  surplus  of  1.9%  of  GOP
In  1988.  This  amounts  to  a  turnaround  equal  to  nine  percentage  polnts
of  GDP.  The  Improvement  In  the  overall  and  In  the  operational  deficlts
are  less  signlflcant  due  to  the  Increased  burden  of  respectlvely  nomlnal
and  real  Interest  payments.
Summing  up,  it  Is  undeniable  that  Morocco  has  taken  a  declslve  step
on  the  road  to  redress  its  fiscal  Imbalances.  The  substantlal
achievements  In  the  overall  budget  reflect  an  even  more  slgnlflcant
Improvement  In  the  primary  deficit  whlch  more  than  compensated  the
rlslng  burden  of  nomlnal  Interest  payments.  The  favourable  evolutlon  of5
the  budget  was  also  facilitated  by  low  and  even  negatlve  real  Interest
rates  on  domestlc  debt.  Thls  situatlon  Is  however  comlng  to  an  end  and
the  Treasury  Is  now  Forced  to  offer  positive  and  hlgh  real  rates  oF
return  to  convince  domestlc  Investors  to  finance  Its  deflclt.  The
average  cost  of servlilng  domestic  debt  Is  likely  to  rlse  qulte  rapldly  In
the  near  Future,  underscorlng  the  need  for  contlnulng  flscal  restralnt.
b) the  primary  deficit.
In  this  section  we  shall  examine  how  the  slzeable  reductlon  In  the
primary  deficit  was  achleved.  The  relevant  data  are  contained  In  Table
3.  It  is  apparent  how  the  burden  of  adjustment  fell  mostly  on  publlc
Investment  which  registered  a  major  fall  fron  11.54%  of  GOP  at  the
onset  of  the  adjustment  program  In  1982  to  only  3.61%  In  1986  and
recovered  then,  but  only  marginally,  to  around  6i  In  1987  and  1988.
The  drop  In  public  investment  was  therefore  the  major  contrlbutlng
factor  In  the  process  of  fiscal  retrenchment.  Thls  Is  an  unfortunate
feature  of  the  adjustment  proc'ess  that  Morocco  shares  wlth  many  other
developing  countries.  We  shall  find  in  a  later  sectlon  how  the  decline  In
publlc  Investment  may  have  negatively  affected  the  prlvate  sector
propensity  to  Invest.  Table  3  shows  how  other  Items  also  provlded  a
sizeable  contribution  to  flscal  restraint.  Expenditure  on  goods  and
services  fell  somewhat,  reflecting  mostly  the  drop  in  public  employees
real  wages  and  the  more  sober  trend  in  public  employment.  Simple
econometric  analysis  (not  reported  here)  shows  that  expendlture  on
goods  and  services  is  not  related  to  It  ':on,  suggestlng  therefore  that
the  latter  was  not  paramount  in  reduL-  ig  public  sector  real  wages.
Finally  we  find  that  also  the  share  of  subsldies  In  GDP  fell
substantially  mainly  because  the  decline  in  Imported  food  prlces
reduced  the  need  for  government  Interventlo.  . This  Is  Incldentally  an
interesting  example  of  the  direct  impact  of  terms  of  trade  fluctuatlons
on  the  budget.
A  comparison  between  the  evolution  of  the  primary  deficit,  as
reported  in  Table  2,  and  the  behaviour  of  public  expenditure  in  Table  3
already  suggests  that  taxation  did  not  provide  a  noticeable  cuntribution
to  the  Improvement  In  the  budget.  As  a  matter  of  fact  taxation  as  a
percentage  of  GDP  fluctuates  around  21%  (Table  4).  Had  It  not  been  for
the  windfall  revenue  attendant  on  the  petroleum  levy  introduced  In  1986,
fiscal  revenues  would  have  actually  registered  a  major  decline  over  the6
perioA  1983-'88.  There  are  several  causes  behind  thls  unsatisfactory
evolutio-i.  On  the  one  hand  this  was  a  time  where,  with  t'ie  support  oF
the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF,  the  Moroccan  government  Introduced  some
far-reaching  reforms  in  the  system  of  both  direct  and  indirect  taxatlon.
For  instance  the  introduction  of  VAT  in  1986  Is  expected  to  represent
in  the  medium-run  a  more  efficient  and  more  reliable  source  of revenue.
Due  to  implementation  problems  it  was  however  accompanied  upon  its
Introduction  by  a  revenue  shortfall.  Similarly  the  overhaul  in  the  system
of  direct  taxation  with  the  phasing  out  of  a  set  of  Income  taxes
differentiated  according  to  income  sources  and  thelr  consolidatlon  Into  -
unique  tax  Is  not  likely  to  contribute  to  the  budget  In  the  very  short-run.
Other  factors  may  also  have  helped  to  determine  the  evolution  of  tax
revenues.  For  Instance  it  is  often  argued  that  high  inflation  will  reduce
the  real  value  of tax  revenues  because  of delays  in  revenues  collectlon.
This  effect  is  unlikely  to be significant  in Morocco  because  of relatlvelv
low  inFlation  levels  and may also  have been  offset  by the  bracket  creeo
mechanism  where  taxpayers  in  an  unlndexed  system  are  taxed  aL
increasing  rates  because  of the  Impact  of inflation  on nomlnal  inrnomes.
Agaln  econometric  evidence  does  not  suggest  a  slgnificant  relatlon
between  the share  of tax revenues  in GDP and the level  of Inflation.
A  further  noticeable  factor  which  affected  the  evolution  of
government  revenues  was  the  process  of  trade  reform.  In  1984,  with
the  support  of  the  World  Bank,  the  Morocco  government,  in  an  attempt
to  rationalise  the  trade  regime  and  reduce  the  protection  to  import-
substituting  productions,  chose to  substantially  reduce  Import  duties  and
gradually  phase  out  the  so-called  special  import  tax,  an  across  the
board  tariff.  The  revenue  shortfall  attendant  upon  this  measure  was
estlmated  to  reach  4%  of  GDP.  Continuing  budgetary  difficulties
prompted  a  reassessment  of  the  sitjation.  In  1987  the  special  import
tariff  had  its  rate  inlcreased  to  12.5%,  from  5%, and  its  name  changed
(to fiscal  import  duty).  This  policy  shift  is  likely  to  lead  to  a growing
contribution  of trade  taxes  to  government  revenues.
The  last  column  of  Table  4  highlights  the  impact  of  terms  of  trade
fluctuations  on  fiscal  revenues.  In  Morocco  production  and  trade  of
phosphate  products  (the  main  foreign  exchange  earners  for  the  country)
are  controlled  by  the  Office  Cherifien  des  Phosphates  (OCP),  a  public
eneterprise.  The  latter  contributes  to  the  Treasury  budget  through  tax
and  dividend  payments.  As  shown  in  the  Table,  these  contributions-6a-
TA3LE  1
BUDGET  DEFIrCT
(cash-basis,  before  debt  relief,  ir,  perzent  of GDF)
Years  Years
19''  2.9;  198:  13.64
1972  4.01  1982  9.22
1973  2.C:  1983  11.51
19I4  3.9  1984  8.07
1975  9.5'  1985  8.57
1976  12.C'  1986  5.69
197,  15.84  1987  6.11
1978  11.28  1988  5.45
1979  15.1-
1S8^  9.0'
Scurce:  World  Ba-.K  data  base.
TABLE  2
BUDGET  DEFICITS:  VAR-CUS  DEFINITIONS
(as a share  of GDP)
cash  basis  payment  order  interest  capital  gains
basis  pavments  cn  dom.  debt
1983  0.115  0.12I  0.049  na
1984  0.081  C.112  0.061  0.031
1985  0.086  0.096  0.062  0.030
1986  0.057  0.053  0.059  0.035
1987  0.061  0.057  0.059  0.022
1988  0.055  0.041  0.060  0.013
capital gains  operational  primary
on  foreig.n debt  deficit  deficit
1983  na  na  0.072
1984  0.005  0.081  0.051
198'  0.019  0.066  0.034
1986  0.017  0.018  -0.006
1987  0.034  0.035  -0.00l2
1988  0.045  0.027  -0.0'.)
Source:  'orld  Bar.  data  base
TABLE  3
CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE
(before  debt  relief,  in percent  of GDP)
Years  Current  Capital  G  &  S  Interests  Subsidies
1971  14.12  3.72  12.51  1.01  0.60
1974  19.25  5.77  12.20  0.85  6.21
1977  18.58  18.93  14.44  1.50  2.63
1979  19.46  12.89  15.05  2.19  2.21
1981  24.60  12.33  15.42  3.88  5.30
1983  23.72  9.64  15.05  4.86  3.81
1984  24.00  8.09  13.63  6.08  4.29
1985  23.09  7.18  12.63  6.23  4.23
1986  20.62  3.61  12.20  5.92  2.50
1987  20.36  6.03  12.64  5.91  1.81
1983  2^.3:  6.34  12.17  6.01  2.13
Sc_rce:  Worit  Ear  k  da:a  tese.7
r-earhed  a  p-ak  in  197/1  Vi,  -,-n-onoitantly  v.  ith  the  phcsphate.  pr.re
bo,^om. ThP,  hav,e  been  declining  since  (except  for  a  small  rebound  in
19B 1), adding  therefore  substantilc,v  to  budgetary  diffirulties.
e)  flwru:n 21  the  budget  dlefiit
The  impact  of  budgst  deficits  on  macroeconorm,ie  conditions  is  to  a
s.gniFicant  extent  a  function  of the  mode  of  financing  of the  deficit  Itself.
It  is  therefore  essential  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  way  budget
imbalances  have  : een  financed  in  "  e  past.  Prior  to  1983,  foreign
borrowing  flnancea  nearly  60%  of  the  Treasury  deficit.  The  avallability
of  foreign  Finance  came  to  Fin abruot  halt  in  1983,  precipitating  a  major
payment  crisis.  The  government  was  Forced  to  rely  to  an  unprecedented
extent  on  Central  Bank  borrowing  during  1983  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,
1984.  This  was  also  the  period  when,  as  it  was  mentioned  earlier,  the
government  increasingly  resorted  to  the  accumulation  of  arrears  as  a
source  of  involuntary  finance  from  the  private  sector.  Yet  the  increased
monetization  of  the  deficit  would  have  unavoidably  provided  fuel  for
inflation.  It  was  the  firm  commitment  by  monetary  authorities  to
eschew  inflationary  financing  which  prompted  a  major  revision  in  the
financing  strategy.  Starting  in  1984  the  government  increasingly  began
tapping  non-inflationary  domestic  sources  of  financing.  The  Treasury
reliance  on  voluntary  domestic  lending  was  enhanced  by  the  need  to
reduce  the  sizeable  stock  of  financial  arrears.  This  strategy  was  helped
by  .he  partial  liberalization  of  domestic  interest  rates  which  was
associated  with  a  major  shift  in  the  private  sector  portfolio
composition  from  currency  to  time  deposits.  At  the  same  time  the
ceiling  on  credit  to  the  economy  forced  commercial  banks  to  channel  a
substantial  part  of  these  financial  resources  to  the  Treasury,  creating
thereby  a  steady  source  of  finance  for  government  deficits.  Another
important  component  of  the  financing  strategy  was  the  direct  sales  of
Treasury  bills  and  bonds  to  the  non-bank  sector.
The  counterpart  of  this  strategy  was  its  increased  cost  to  the
Treasury.  To  make  time  deposits  more  palatable  to  commercial  banks,
they  were  excluded  from  the  base  on  whict  obligatory  investment  in
Treasury  bonds  are  calculated.  Together  with  the  reduction  of  arrears
and  the  need  to  offer  att  tive  (post-tax)  returns  on  direct  issues  of
government  bonds,  this  measure  induced  a  significant  increase  in  the
cost  of  domestic  financing  for  the  Treasury.  This  is  -Iearly  reflectedin  the  rapid  increase  in  the  average  real  Interest  rate  on  government
domest  ic  debt,  as  noticed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  Further
iristitutional  developments  arz  likely  to  reinforce  this  trend,  iF existing
pr-oposals  to  reduce  liquidity  and  portfolio  requirements  for  tne  banking
sector  are  implemented.  In  the  last  section  of  this  paper,  we  shall
assess  the  macroeconomic  impact  of  furthering  the  process  of  financial
liberalization.
We can  try  to  sum  up  the  main  conclusions  of  this  section  and  draw
some  implications  for  the  future  course  of  fiscal  policy  in  Morocco.
Overall  Morocco  has  been  quite  successful  in  coping  with  VormIdable
financial  difficulties.  The  foreclosing  of  foreign  borrowing  In  1983
represented  a  major  shock  to  the  economy  and  to  the  Treasury,  more
significant  perhaps  than  the  rise  in  international  Interest  rates.  The
two-prong  response  of  M4croccan  policy-makers  relied  on  a  sharp
reduction  in  the  Treasury  i,nancing  needs  and  a  shift  in  the  composition
of  finance  with  a  view  of  eschewing  inflationary  pressures.  A  key  to  the
success  of  this  strategy  was  the  availability  of  relatively  cheap  sourcs,
of  domestic  finance,  mostly  determined  by  a  complex  system  ,t
Financial  regulations.  However  the  difficulties  of  relying  at  the  margin
on  financial  repression  as  a  cheap  source  of  funds,  together  with  the
relaxing  of  fiscal  discip,ine  in  the  most  recent  years,  have  already
prompted  a  reassessment  of  ex'sting  strategies  and,  perhaps  merea
crucially,  highlighted  the  shiarp  trade-offs  that  continuing  budget
disequilibria  entail.  Today  the  major  question  facing  Morocco's  policy-
makers  is  'shether  the  fiscal  policy  stance  is  consistent  with  the
mainterance  of  low  inflation,  the  resumption  of  investment  and  growth
and  the  external  payments  constraint.
Consider  the  not  too  unlikely  case  where  foreign  finance  will  not
increase  substantially  in  the  medium-run.  Under  these  circumstances,
the  failure  to  oersevere  on  the  road  to  fiscal  discipline  may  entail
severe  macroeconomic  consequences.  Even  the  perpetuation  of  present
financing  strategies  of  a  relatively  unchanged  budget  deficit  would  soon
run  into  severe  problems.  First  of  all  the  bucget  is  still  evtremely
vulnerable  to  international  interest  rates  and  terms  of  trade  shocks.
For  instance  the  revenue  from  the  petroleum  levy  which  in  1988  still
represented  3.4%  oF GDP  is  likely  to  vanish  under  increasing  oil  prices.
Second  the  cost  of  domestic  finance  is  likely  to  rise  steeply  in  the9
future.  Again  the  Treasury  budget  would  be  extremely  vulnerable  to  such
evolution.  Would  the  cost  oF  servicing  domestic  debt  Increase  to
competitive  market  rates,  this  would  add  to  the  budget  an  extra  burden
equal  to  around  2%  of  CDP.
Could  Morocco  resort  at  the  margin  on  larger  monetlzation  of  the
deficit  ?  By  internatiou,al  standards  Morocco  s  inflation  Is  typlcally
low.  An  increase  in  the  Inflatlon  tax  may  then  represent  a  palatable
alternative.  However,  besides  the  danger  of  tampering  with  monetary
policy  and  damaging  the  credibility  of  the  Central  Bank  commitment
against  Inflation,  thero.  Is  ac-tually  little  room  for  a  substantial
contribution  to  budget  Financlng  from  Increased  monetizatlon  of  the
deficit.  We  will  show  in  the  next  sectlon  that,  for  Morocco,  estimated
elasticities  From  a  system  of  assets  demand  indicate  an  extremely
unfavourable  trade-off  between  inflation  and  monetary  financing.
Continuing  reliance  on  non-inflationary  sources  of  domestlc  finance  is
thereFore  essential  to  keep  Inflation  under  check.  However  this  strategy
could  result  in  large  increases  In  domestic  real  rates  of  interest.
Besides  putting  into  jeopardy  budget  equilibria,  this  would  most  likely
crowd  out  investment.  Moreover  even  if  the  increase  In  interest  rates
did  not  materialize  and  the  perpotuation  of  a  system  of  financlal
regulations  guaranteed  a  source  of  inexpensive  finance  for  the  Treasury,
the  impact  of  unabated  budget  deficits  on  investment  and  on  growth
would  still  be  signi ficant  because  of  their  effects  on  credit  markets.
We shall  examine  this  issue  in  section  4.-9a-
TABLE  4
TAX  REVEENJES  (as  a  share  of GDP)
Total  Income  Taxes  on  goods  Taxes  on
revenue  taxes  and  serv.  int.  trade
1971  0.1'849  0.C282?  0.07604  0.02582
1972  0.14401  0.02814  0.07402  0.02407
1973  0.16157  0.03206  0.07454  0.02879
1974  0.21112  0.03294  0.06797  0.03625
1975  0.23329  0.07023  0.07320  0.04331
1976  0.20292  0.04011  0.07688  0.04184
1977  0.21672  0.05145  0.08326  0.05187
1978  0.2120i  0.05343  0.08012  0.04993
1979  0.22246  0.05364  0.07990  0.05477
1980  0.20506  0.04507  0.07836  0.05562
1981  0.22570  0.04765  0.07642  0.06190
1982  0.22046  0.04125  0.08410  0.06235
1983  0.21272  0.04380  0.08768  0.05307
1984  0.2v890  0.04438  0.08510  0.05009
1985  0.20653  0.04337  0.08376  0.04456
1986  0.18891  0.04040  0.07089  0.03629
1987  0.20679  0.0.475  0.07656  0.03561
1988  0.22582  0.34717  0.07793  0.03954
petroleum  other  OCP
levy  taxes  contributions
1971  0.00000  0.01836  0.00182
1972  0.00000  0.01778  0.00176
1973  0.00003  0.02617  0.00609
1974  0.00000  0.07395  0.06306
1975  0.00000  0.04655  0.06776
1976  0.00000  0.04408  0.02316
1977  0.00000  0.03014  0.01843
1978  0.00000  0.02852  0.01450
1979  0.00000  0.03415  0.01128
1980  0.00000  0.02601  0.01080
1981  0.00000  0.03973  0.01641
1982  0.00000  0.03276  0.00581
1983  0.00000  0.02817  0.00756
1984  0.00000  0.02933  0.00979
1985  0.00000  0.03484  0.01342
1986  0.02444  0.01689  0.00000
1987  0.02782  0.02204  0.00290
1988  0.03375  0.02743  0.00401
Source:  World  Bank  data  base
TABLE  5
IMPACT  ON  INFLATION  CF A  1% INCREASE  IN THE  GDP  SHARE
OF  MONETARY  FINANCING
Initial  inflation  low  elasticities  High  elasticities
4%  7.5%  7.6%
6%  9.8%  11.1%
8%  12.9%  16.9%
10%  16.7%  26.4%
Source: own calculaticns10
3.  ASSETS  DEMAND,  SEI-;INORAGE  AND THE INFLATION  TAX.
Received  wisdom  argues  that,  following  the  drying  up  of  commercial
lending  after  1982,  developing  countries  had  to  make  a  twin  transfer  of
resources:  one  abroad  to  foreign  creditors  insofar  as  new  lending  had
fallen  much  below  the  required  service  on  outstanding  external  debt;  the
other  internal,  toward  the  governnent,  to  the  extent  that  in  several
developing  countries  the  State  had  taken  onto  itself  the  burden  of
servicing  foreign  debt.  Together  with  the  increase  in  interest  rates  and
the  fall  in  terms  of  trade,  this  has  often  meant  the  disruption  of
budgetary  equilibria,  already  jeopardised  in  many  cases  by  previous
unsustainable  fiscal  policies.  The  inflexibility  of  the  tax  system,  the
downward  rigiditv  of  fiscal  expenditure  (with  the  noticeable  exception  of
public  investment)  and  the  thinnes  of  domestic  financial  markets  left
then  little  choice  to  local  policy-makers  but  to  monetize  the  fiscal
deficits  with  sometlmes  calamitous  consequences  on  the  inflation  rate.
Under  this  interpretation,  the  exceptional  inflation  record  in  Morocco
is  undoubtedly  puzzling.  In  the  previous  secticn  it  was  shown  how
financial  repression,  by  channeling  low  cost  funds  to  the  Treasury,  was
instrumental  in  a  strategy  of  relying  on  non-inflationary  sources  oF
budegt  financing.  Yet  the  question  remains  of  why  Morocco's  pollcy-
makers  remain  staunchly  opposed  to  even  a  limited  monetlzatlon  of  the
deficit  and  a  greater  reliance  on  the  inflation  tax.  As  a  matter  of  fact
inflation  in  Morocco  is  extremely  low,  2.3%  in  1988,  even  by  the  most
stringent  international  standards.  A  recent  report  (United  Nations-
World  Bank,  1990),  wh le  not  explictly  advocating  an  increase  In
Inflation,  argues  nonetheless  that  there  is  some  mileage  for  boosting
revenues  from  the  inflation  tax.  The  issue  however  cannot  be  solved  on
purely  theoretical  grounds  as  the  inflationary  implications  of  deficlt
monetization  depend  on  the  response  of  money  base  demand  to  changes
in  inflation  and  interest  rates.  In  what  follows  we  shall  argue  that  the
outlook  for  greater  monetization  of  the  budget  deficlt  In  Morocco  Is
altogether  unfavourable.  If  we  also  consider  the  destabilising  effects  on
Morocco's  social  fabrics  and  the  loss  of Central  Bank  credlbility  that  a
higher  inflation  would  Imply,  we  can  perhaps  understand  the  firm
commitment  of the  country's  policy-makers  in favour  of prlce  stability.
The  scope  for  increased  government  revenue  from  seignorage  and  the11
inFlation  tat< is  determined  by  the  private  sector's  choice  of  assets.  In
this  paragraph  we  rely  on  a  standard  Tobin's  portfolio  approach  to
analyse  the  demand  for  currency,  demand  and  time  deposits.  Other
assets  are  not  included  in  our  analysis  on  the  ground  that,  with  the
exception  of  real  assets,  they  play  a  minor  role  in  the  private  sector's
choices.  In  what  follows  we  assume  that  the  demand  for  each  asset  Is
related  to  its  own  return,  the  other  assets'  returns  and  the  level  of
income.  As  a  proxy  for  the  return  on  real  assets  we  use  the  (expected)
inflation  rate,  which  however  is  not  observable.  We  assume  that
expectations  are  formed  rationally  and  depend  on  the  set  of  inFormatlon
available  at  time  t-i,  which  is  defined  to  include  the  lagged  level  of
prices,  the  money  supply,  the  wage  rate  and  the  exchange  rate.
According  to  our  estimates,  the  last  variable  does  not  contribute
significantly  to  the  prediction  of  future  prices.  This  prellminary
evidence  suggests  that,  for  Morocco,  the  pass-through  from  the  nominal
exchange  rate  to  domestic  prices  is  Fairly  weak  accounting  therefore  for
the  fact  that  a  sizeable  real  depreciation  did  not  translate  into  higher
inflation.  Similarly  the  significant  impact  of  wages  on  prices  supports
the  claim  that  wage  moderation  (the  real  minimum  wage  declined  by
7.3%  from  1983  to  1988,  after  increasing  by  17% in  the  three  prevlous
years)  was  instrumental  in  containing  inflation.
The  fitted  value  from  the  price  equation  is  used  as  an  estimate  for
expected  inflation.  In  the  process  of  estimation,  we  rely  on  Pagan's
(1984)  procedure  and  use  our  proxy  for  expected  inflation  as  an
instrument  for  actual  inflation.  This  procedure  is  designed  to  yield
consistent  standard  errors  for  the  coefficients.  We  still  have  to
determine  whether  the  system  of  assets  demand  should  be  expressed  In
nominal  terms  (with  prices  included  among  the  explanatory  variables
and  the  relevant  homogeneity  assumptions  tested)  or  in  real  terms.  We
take  the  first  course  for  the  sake  of  generality  and  assume  thereby  that
assets  demand  do  not  fully  respond  instantaneously  to  changes  in  prices.
We  also  allow  for  the  possibility  of  lagged  adjustr 1ient  to  income  and
interest  rates  variations.  Therefore  the  estimating  equation  for  a
generic  asset  MW  reads  as:
In MJt  ao +  a,  In Pt  +  a2 In Pt_l  + a3 In  Yt  +  a4 In Yt  + as  it
+  a6  it 1 +  a7 Tre  +  ae  In  M(I) t-i  t  ~  Mt-i12
where  p  and  Y  denote  the  prlce  and  Income  level  respectively,  "I"
represents  the  vector  of assets'  returns  and  Tre Is  expected  Inflatlon.  We
would  expect  that  in  the  long-run  the  prlce  elastlclty  of assets  demand  is
equal  to  one,  I.e.  that  assets  demands  are  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in
prices.  Formally  this  implies  t,Lat  a1+a2=i-a 8 . We  can  reparametrlze
the  prevlous  equation  to  test  this  restrict3on:
In  (Mj/p)t  =  ao  +  (a,-1)  In Pt  +  a3  ln  Yt  +  84  ln  Yt  +  as  It
+  a6 i  +  a7 wet  +  (a8+a2)  In pt_,  +  a8 ln  (MJ/p)t_1  (2)
If  long-run  price  homogeneity  holds,  we  have
ln  (Mj/p)t  =  ao  - (a2 +a8)  A  In  Pt  +  a3 In  Yt  +  84  In  Yt  +  as  it
+  a(,  1  + a7  wre + a8 ln  (M  /P)t  (3)
Eq.  (3)  shows  that  Imposing  long-run  prlce  homogenelty  In  a  context
where  assets  are  expressed  in  real  terms  adds  a  backward-looklng
Inflation  term,  A  In  p,  to  the  equation  itself.  This  term  however  does
not  reflect  any  substitution  effects  between  real  and  financlal  assets,  but
only  lagged  adjustment  to  price  changes.  Traditional  money  demand
equations  where  Inflationary  expectations  are  simply  modelled  in  a
backward-looking  fashion  may  therefore  mistakenly  Interpret  the
significance  of  A  In  p  as  evidence  of  substitution  toward  real  assets,
whereas  only  a  process  of  dynamic  adjustment  Is  Involved.  Our
approach  allows  to  distinguish  between  these  two  effects  by  separately
evaluating  the  statistical  signlficance  of  A  In  p  and  Tr . Admittedly
though,  the  coexistence  of these  two  effects  may  be  difficult  to  justlfy  on
purely  theoretical  grounds.
In  the  estimatlon  process  we  include  in  the tector  of  assets'  returns
("i")  only  the  Interest  rate  on  time  depo_its,  I  . Some  demand  deposits
are  also  remunerated,  but  their  return  moves  in  a  almost  perfectly
collinear  way  with  the  one  on time  deposits.  We have  therefore  Included
the  remunerated  component  of  demand  deposlts  in  the  aggregate  of  time
deposits.  We  can  now  describe  the  results  of  the  estimatlon  of  the
system  of  assets  demand.  Our  estimation  strategy  Is  as  follows.  We
start  from  the  more  general  dynamic  specification  In  eq.  3  and  restrlct
the  model  to  obtain  a  parsimonious  representation  of the  data  generatlng1 3
process.  In what  foll-ws  ,e  only  report  the  F.nal  e,quation.
All  equations  are  estimated  over  the  1974-1988  period.  The  last
year  however  is  saved  to  test  For  out-of-sample  stability.  We  begin  by
the  demand  for  currency.
A  In  (CUR  /pt)  -.  -1.10  itd  +  .30  In  Y  - .60  In  (Pt/Pt_1)
t  t  (  17i  (. 17t  (.07)  (.14)
- .70  In  (CURt  iPt-  l)
DW = 2.01  SER  .013  LM  - .25  Hendry  =  1.47
The  demand  for  currency  (CC9E)  is  significantly  related  to  the
interest  rate  on  time  deposits  (i  )  and  to  income.  Actual  inflation
appears  in  the  equation  with  a  short-run  elasticity  of  .60.  This  is  not
necessarily,  as  mentioned  earlier,  an  indication  of  significant
substitution  possibilities  between  currency  and  real  assets,  but  may
simply  reflect  the  fact  that  nominal  demand  for  currency  fully  adjusts
to  changes  in  the  price  level  only  in  the  long-run.  The  coefficient  on
expected  inflation  instead  is  not  signiFicantly  difFerent  from  zero  and
bears  the  wrong  (positive)  sign.  Jointly  estimating  the  price  and  the
currency  equations  (and  testing  for  the  expectational  restrictions)  did
not  improve  the  results.  The  variable  7re therefore  has  been  eliminated
from  the  final  equation.  Finally  the  hypotheses  that  nominal  demand  for
currency  be  unit-elastic  in  the  long  run  with  respect  to  the  price  level
and  to  income  are  not  rejected  by  the  data  (tio  =  .94).  As  diagnostic
tools  we  rely  on  the  Hendry  test  for  out-oF-sample  stability  and  the
Lagrange  multiplier  test  for  serial  correlation.  Both  are  distributed  as
X (1).  They  do  not  provide  any  indications  of  misspecification.
We now  turn  to  the  equation  for  demand  deposits  (DD).
In  (DD /Pt)  =  -11.65  - 8.46  i  td  1.03  ln  (pt/pt1)  +  1.20  ln  Yt  +
t  t  (4.26)  (2.96)  t  41)  (.37)
.76  ln  Y
(.26)
DW =  1.43  SER. =  .033  LM  =  1.56  Hendry  =  .81
Demand  deposits  have  been  defined  to  exclude  saving  deposits.14
Following  this  modification,  we  find  that  both  inflation  and  the  return
on  time  deposits  pla>E a  significant  role  in  affecting  demand  deposits.
The  long-run  income  elasticity  is  equal  to  1.96  and  significantly
different  from  one.  Once  again  expected  inflation  does  not  contr'bute
in  a  statistically  significant  way  to  the  equation.  There  is  no  sign  of
misspecification  as  indicated  by the  usual  battery  of tests.
The  last  component  of our  menu  oF assets  are  time  deposits  (TD):
A  In  (TD /Pt)  = -1.54  +  6.94  I td  +  .96  [(In Y  - In  (TD[  /Pt  1)]
t  t  (.8D)  (4.22)t  (.18)  t  t-  t
DW =  1.97  SER  =  .09  LM  =  .02  Hendry  =  .18
As  expected,  time  deposits  respond  positively,  albeit  not  very
significantly,  to  an  increase  in  their  own  rate  oF return.  The  dynamic
specification  of  the  equation  is  very  simple.  There  is  no  evidence  of
lagged  adjustment  to  prices  as  indicated  by  the  insignificant  coefficient
on  actual  inflation.  On the  same  ground,  also  expected  inflation  has  been
excluded  from  the  final  equation.  It  was  not  possible  to  reject  the
hypothesis  that  the  demand  for  time  deposits  Is  unit-elastic  with
respect  to  income  (F1,9 =  .54).  The  LM  and  Hendry  tests  Fail  to  point
to  some  misspecification  problems.
Overall  the  previous  results  indicate  that  the  demand  for  monetary
assets  In  Morocco  is  strongly  influenced  by  the  patterns  oF returns.  The
estimated  semi-elastlcltles  on  the  interest  rate  on  time-deposits  suggest
potentially  conspicuous  shifts  in  portfolio  composition  In  response  to
variation  of  the  structure  of  interest  rates.  There  is  however  less
Indication  of  strong  substitution  posslbilltles  with  respect  to  real
assets.  Our  proxy  for  expected  inflation  never  proved  to  be  significant  In
any  of  the  three  equations.  It  is  not  apparently  a  problem  of
multicollinearity  insofar  as  the  coefficient  on  actual  inflation  was  quite
well  determined  even  in  the  more  general  specifications.  It  is  not  either
a  problem  of  statistical  methodology.  Our  approach  should  provide  at
least  consistent  estimates  oF  the  coefficients  and  of  their  standard
errors.  As  mentioned  earlier,  more  eFficient  simultaneous  estimation
methods  which  also  allow  for  the  expectational  restrictions  fall  to
change  the  basic  findings.  Perhaps  our  proxy  for  expected  lnflatlon  Is
not  well  specified.  Alternatively,  expectations  may  to  a  large  extent15
have  an  adaptive  form.  We leave  the  matter  unsettled.
To  c,-mpute  the  amount  oF  monetary  financing  the  government  can
count  upon,  we  must  allow  for  the  fact  that  in  Morocco  a  distlnction
must  be  made  between  reserve  requirements,  which  apply  only  to
demand  deposits,  and  liquidity  requirements,  which  force  commercial
banks  t,-  invest  a  fixed  share  oF  their  deposits  in  low  yield  treasury
bills.  Recent  financial  sector  reForms  have  however  substantlally
inc reased  the  interest  rate  paid  on  liquidity  requirements  which  now
approaches  market  rates  levels.  We  include  therefore  liquldity
requirements  in  the  domestic  public  debt.  The  narrowly  defined
monetary  base  (MB) is  thereFore  equal  to:
MBS,  = c  t  +  rrdd  DDt  (4)
where  rrdd  is  the  reserve  requirement  coeFficient  for  demand  deposits.
At  any  point  of  time  the  amount  oF monetary  financing  is  equal  to  the
change  in  the  monetary  base.  As  a  share  of  nominal  GDP,  the  amount  of
monetary  Financing,  A  MB t/(pt  Yt)  is  equal  to  the  rate  of  change  of
monetary  base,  (A MBt/MBt),  times  the  GDP  share  of  MB,  (MBt/ptYt).
We  can  now  use  eq.  4,  together  with  our  estimates  of  the  demand  of
currency  and  demand  deposits,  to  evaluate  the  relationship  between
inflation  and  the  amount  oF monetary  financing.  We  focus  on  a  steady
state  situation  and  arbitrarily  impose  that  demand  deposits  be  unit-
elastic  with  respect  to  income.  As  a  result,  the  growth  rate  of MB will
be  equal  to  the  sum  of  output  growth  (n)  and  inflation  (Tr).  Similarly
the  GDP  share  of  MB  will  depend  on  the  level  of  nominal  interest  rates
and,  possibly.  of  inflation:
CUR rrdd D  r  d
A MB/ (pY)  =  +n)  CUR + rrddDD  =  (Tr+n)  [ A  eacr+  rrdd  B e  9  ]
p Y  (5)
where  the  coefficients  A  and  a  (B  and  6)  are  computed  from  our
estimates  of  the  currency  (demand  deposits)  equation.  In  assessing  the
value  oF a  and  6  we  face  a  basic  ambiguity.  Changes  in  the  inflation  rate
can  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  demand  for  monetary  base  to  the  extent
that  they  lead  to  cor.-esponding  variations  in  nominal  interest  rate.  We
assume  this  to  be  fully  the  case.  But  changes  in  Tr have  also  a  direct
effect  on  the  demand  for  currency  and  deposits.  However  if  we  interpret16
the  signiFicant  coefficient  of  actual  inflation  in  our  estimates  as  simply
evidence  of  lagged  adjustment,  then  this  effect  should  not  reasonably
play  a  role  in  this  steady  state  kitid  of  analysls.  If  alternatlvely  we
believe  that  expectations  are  adaptive  and  our  results  reflect  the
existence  of  significant  substitution  possibilities  with  real  assets,  then
inflation  should  have  an  indipendent  effect.  Notice  that,  In  the  latter
case,  changes  in  inflation  will  exert  a  larger  Impact  on  the  demand  for
monetary  base.  In what  follows  we  allow  for  both  posslbllltles.
We can  use  eq.  5  to  compute  the  effect  of  a one  percent  change  In the
inflation  rate  on  the  quantity  of  monetary  financing  as  a  share  of  GDP.
We  take  GDP  growth  to  be  equal  to  4  percent.  From  eq.  5,  it  Is  clear
that  this  derivative  is  a  function  of the  Initial  share  In GDP  of  currency
and  time  deposits,  which  in  turn  depends  on the  Inflation  rate  Itself.  We
can  also  compute  the  inverse  derivative,  which  measures  the  Ir-rease
in  the  inflation  rate  attendant  on  a  one  percent  Increase  in  the  GDP
share  of  monetary  financing  (Table  5).  Our  estimates  suggest  that  the
inflationary  impact  of  higher  monetization  Increases  very  rapldly  and
the  trade-offs  between  Inflation  and  inflation  tax  worsens  zubstantially
as  inflation  increases.  This  provides  considerable  support  to  the  cholce
of  Moroccan  policy-makers  not  to  rely  on  inflationary  forms  of  deficit
finance.17
lN.  I\L'KTM-'N  AN'  `AVINi  A  'I LLIIIDN
AN  h'sth  rat-~  -I  in.-~?tm;nr--r  e-.ents  a  basic  condit'ion  fo-r  ru-taine'
!n.x-agc~  in  ec-nomn,-  gr-oxth  -,e  the  long-term.  Since  1992  ho\ever
the  fGUrre-nt  Fpicer  'p  chare  of  invostment  in  Moro-cco  has  been
stoa1i'.  falling  %,ith  the  o nl,  e<-eption  of  19_RS'.  raising  increasing
c2Dncer nr  about  th"-  long-run  perFs-pecives  oF the  economy.  L,oo.king  at  tho
>:-nstant  price  ratio  bet.v.Feen int-stment  and  iGP  wouldi  onlP  accentuate
tr.-  Fall'  in  in .est`ien,  beause  .'  the  irncrease  in  the  real  price  of
in. estmentF  goods  .attesndant  on  the  real  deprecdation.  More  wsiorry,ingly
porhaps,  the  drop  ir .acital  a-cuTnlation  is  a  generalised  cne,  in.dylving
bot,h  pub:i>  andr pr-i'ate  in.estment.  Contra-v  to  initial  e<pectati':ns,  the
fi-a1'  rtrenchment  v<.h;,ch to-k  a  toll  or  public  investment  was  not
- rnsa  -nEtE,d  ,  a  matc-hing  irr.zrac--  in  private  investment.  Is  the  Fall  in
:n'.  eatmont  ailEnlficart  cause  F,or  -c,ncern  7  Surely  enough,  it  co-uld  be
a-rgue-d  that  m  '-t  :)F the  Fa'l  in  .rEvestment  can  be  predicated,  on  the
high^er  c,-st  epr  cap tal.  enco uaging  less  capitalintensiv,e  projects
(ardi  remo>Xving the  pre.icus  Fbias  a&falnst  labourintensive  productions:',  an
i-crease  in  the  of  c-apital  wou  allow  the  same  level  of  grow>th  to
be  ae;ed  ith  a  l.  er  volume  oF  investment.  LUnder  this
nt-rpretIatln  thD  ropi  in  inestunt  would  on.;,  represent  the  out-ome
F atcusting  to  a  no..  constellatioDn  of  factor  prices.  Empirical  evidence
-r  a  roJatiel>  large  samFle  co  developing  countries  (Faini  and  de
!-:-.  199s  rufLggesto that  CcsDt ,-F  capital  considerations  can  account
on'.  f-r  a  small  fraction  of  the  fall  in  investment  and  other  factors
t!he-ref-re  must  be-  at  .%vork.  In  ,,,hat  follows:,  We  shall  assess  the
r>-.-s,>-  F9--f thlis  aFproach  for  the  -- ase  of  Morocco.
We-  ro  -r.  a  smzer  m.de'  rf  a  Firm.  The  fir,m  is  assumed  to
a  m:<1-!7e  itS  rne-t  v-. -rtk.  sub  c--  1-  a  standard  nsoolasK'  -ai  p'-oluctio-n
r--t.-  r-cr.t.-a-t  . tl-  the  itionalt  s-t-up  hov-.e,vr.  financ,ial
a--sl  '  h  a  shFi  -'iant  boearing  on  real  d  '  E
o  mr-'.-<'  th>e  9.mQ>a-t  I  f 9nancia,  variables  by  assuming  that  e<ternal
-suit`.  fiErancing  is  una,.ilaHle  and  the  firm  must  rely  on  two  alternative
c-.urmzcs  oF  in.-stmo-nt  F 1narde,  i.e.  retained  earnings  and  bank's  debt.
von  that  the  entreproeu  rs'  discount  rate  is  assumed  toD)  be  larger  than
the  rik-Fr-ee  int-reFt  rate  (otherwise  the  Firm  would  accumulate18
fr.naa %  acs.tt  . doLt;  is',  theF  favoured  ErUri  oef  in\eswtmcnt f:nan,re.
prl;>.-  Ferhap  tF  au--  .f  ta  :nsiderat  ios).  Ar  internal  sciin  fc:r
the  optimal  dett  choice  of  the  firm  still!  e<1-ts.  though.  prnxbided  that
v.e  assume  that  h!gher  debt,  relativel',y  tD  the  firm's  capita!  stor k,  is
as,lt  '.52th increasing  agenc,  costs.  Emal'l,  because  of  -oQnstraints
in  the  credit  market,  at  each  point  of  time  the  adebt to  capital  r.ticfk
rati,-  of  the  firm  is  b.ound by  an  upper  ronstraint.  Formally,:
maK  (  F.  Y  Nt  - qt  It  +  Et  1itr)-1
1~~~~~~~~~~~  t-  C(t  'It  Kt!]  (.
s.t.  K  ￿  f*  qt  Kt  (7;
t  FKt.N  (8'
KCt  fI:iKs_,  +  It1c
'x.here.  in  standard  notations,  Y,  N,  K  and  I  represent  the  level  of
pr oduction,  employment,  capital  stock  and  investment  respectively,
whereas  B denotes  the  outstanding  stock  of  debt.  The  function  et  !  with
c  >0.  cjj')  and  c2<0,  is  the  agency  cost  function,  which  is. assumed  to
be  quadratic.  The  output  price  is  indicated  as  p,  the  wage  as  w,  the
price  oF  investment  goods  as  q,  while  r  and  i  denote  the  interest  rate
and  the  discount  rate  respectively.  We  assume  that  I+i=  (l+r)  (I+k)
N.here  k  is  a  multiplicative  risk  premium.  Finally  d  is  the  depreciation
rate.  Eq.  6  is  the  leverage  constraint  whi-ch  defines  the  madmum
amount  of  debt  as  a  time  varying  proportion  (E*)  cf  the  capital  stock,
while  eq.  7  and  8  describe  the  production  relationships  and  the  capital
accumulation  identity  respectively.  Suppose  first  that  the  debt
constra;nt  is  not  binding.  It  can  be  easily  shown  that,  at  an  optimum,
debt  Vill  be  a  fixed  proportion  ,  say  y,  of  nominal  capital  stock.  In
turn  v  is  a  function  of  the  risk  premium  k  and  oF  the  parameters
aFfecting  the  position  of  the  agency  cost  function  2  Notice  that  y  does
not  depend  on  the  interest  rate.  As  matter  of fact,  variations  in  r  (or  in
the  discount  rate  i)  affect  the  level  of  investment,  not  the  con.position  of
its  financing.  The  choice  oF  y  in  turn  afFects  the  demand  for  capital
which  is  otherw.ise  determined  in  a  standard  way.  IF  we  consider  the
case  where  the  debt  constraint  is  binding  (i.e.  B*<y),  financial
conditions  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  demand  for  capital.  Under  linear1 9
'''-'r-lit.  ':n9>i:n''r  inr F:r--:i,ti.:n.  it  c-arn t:  >,  shown  that  the  optimll
->  ta*. ¶t>'K  ..:'.  i:.  n  a  furw't .-r  of  zutrut.-F the  r,aa  cost  o-f capit-l  rini
the  Aa.la  liti-  --f  d4t:t.  FsrniaJiv:
KC  K  Y . -4
i  (1  p  4-  I  arameters  r  and  p  den.:te  the
:--rprt>  ta  rate  and  the  percentage  reduction  in  q  indiuc-  t.  the
s  - ,r  fiscal  and  financial  in-entives  available  t,  investors  in
Mi.-r~-r-.  Fu'l  details  For  the  calculations  of  r  arnd p  are  provilr-l  in
W-Drlid  dlk  (1990?.
fJne  -r'2,blem  .w;ith the  Formulatio-n  of  eq.  10  is  that  it  containr  one
oh'  i-uF']  Ssndigenous  variable,  the  le,el  of  output  Y  . In  what  follows  we
rel;  lr  th-  Following  procDedure.  It  is  assumed  that,  because  oF delivery
lags,  flrms  must  determine  their  desired  level  of  output,  and  therefore
their  investment,  one  period  in  advance.  They  will  need  therefore  to
predict,  based  on  available  inFormation,  the  optimal  level  of  capaoity
outrut  For  the  Following  period.  This  will  in  turn  determine  their
demand  fo r  investmenrt  gcods.  We  alsco assume  that  expectations  about
thp  determinants  of  the  output  decision  can  be  simply  modelled  by  a
Fir-st-o-rder  autoregressive  process.  The  expected,  optimal  level  of  cutput
(t- Iy t '  ,,iJll thereFoDre be equal  to:
t-' IYt  =Y  (Ft- I ,  '>t- I,'t  _t-I PUbt_  tv-1'st-1!  II
w.here  the  inFormatilon  set  has  been  augmented1  to  include  both  Ipub  (the
level  cF  public  investnment  on  the  ground  that  this  may  affect  the
pro-ducti,on  relationship  >  and  MS  (the  stock  of  money,  as  a  further
predictor  of  prices).  In  estimating  eq.  I  1  we  must  allow  For  the  fact
that  t  Yt  is  not  observatle.  Howeve-,  under  rational  expectations,  it
will  YVfetr  From  actual  output  Y  only  for  a  random  term  uncorrelated
w\.ith an'.  available  informaticn  at  t-I.  We  can  therefore  use  the  actual
product  :-n level  Y  Es  the  dependent  variable  and  take  the  Fitted  '.alue  oF
eq.  I I  as  the  estimate  of  expected  output.
2'.  estimating  eq.  11,  it  is  now  possible  to  take  into  account  the
endogeneity  oF Y  in  eq.  10.  We  follow  again  Pagan's  (198t  suggestion
and  take  the  estimated  value  of  Y  (Y.F) in  eq.  1I  as  an  instrument  For
the  actual  level  oF output  in  eq.  10.  We  present  First  the  estimates  of20
~~(ri  .u(1:.  i  1 
+C.:  (I,  . Ye  +  C. +9Mo - l
!  F-u'  k.K+t tim  s.C  di:.9
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w,here-  dil  iF  a  dummy  variab-e  which  takes  a  '.r!ue  of  I  in
coDrrespcndanm2e of  the  agricultural  negative  supply  shocks  in  1981,
19.33  and  1937.  The  wage  rate  dc1es rot  pro.tide  a  si-ni6ant
ccntributicn  to  the  equation.  This  may  be  attributed  to- measuremenrt
errors  (\We use  an  indicator  of  the  minimum  wage)  or  to  the  fal-t  that
labcur  does  represent  a  signifIcant  ccnstrdint.  T  he  cocst  of  c acpital
instead  appears  to  plaY  a  more  significant  rcle  together  with  public
inv,estment  and  the  money  supply.  As  a  diagnostic  t-ol,  we  relv  on  the
Lagirange  Multiplier  test  for  serial  correlati:n,  which  does  not  indicate
any  significant  problems.  Mloving>  nov.'  to  the  investment  equation,  we
find  that:
A  In lt  -3  .555+  1.9 4  A  InY  - .6  In  (l'Y  - - .7  In  (e/F: (q1.82)  ( .83)  t  '1  (c/pt-  Bt
5-.67  (2  /Y)
2
R  -. 50  DW=  1.i1  SER  P  .12
whe;re  I  represents  private  investment.  E  /Y,  the  ratic  oF firms  credit
to  ';Ci7,  is  used  as  a  pro<y  of the  stringerFcv  at  an aggregate  lev,el of the
debt  constrain:.  The  equation  hIs  b-een  estimiatd  by  an  inst-umental
.ar  abl9e  pFrcedure,  with  the  fitted  value  frorr  eq.  11  as  an  instrunmonn
f-r  Y.  The  restriction  that  investment  be  unit-elastic  w,ith  rspect  tu
_utFut  has  Leen  tested  (tI2z  .5)  and  imposed  or  the  data.
The  estimation  of  eql.  10  yields  two  interesting  results.  First
investment  is  signiFicantly  affected  by  the  real  cost  of  capital.  Fiscal
policy  can  therefore  affect  the  investment  decision  through  its  impact21
cn  interest  rates  or,  more  directly,  by  changing  the  set  of  fiscal  and
finanrial  incentives  available  to  investors.  Second  the  level  of
InN  estment  in the  economy  will  also  depend  on  the  availability  oF credit.
The  joint  presence  of  both  the  cost  of  capltal  and  oF credit  avallability
mak  appear  redundant  (or  even  contradictory),  until  we  recall  that
investment  in  this  model  is  not  fully  determined  by  the  stock  of  credit
that  financial  intermediaries  are  willing  to  extend  to  firms.  Even  if
Firms  are  credit  constrained,  a  change  In  the  interest  rate  r  wlll  still
affect  investment  through  its  impact  on  the  discount  rate  i  and  thus  on
the  choice  cf  retained  earnings.  By  varying  their  retention  behavlour
firms  can  relax  somewhat  the  credit  constraint.  Fiscal  policy  therefore
will  aFfect  investment  by  influencing  either  the  Interest  rate  or  credit
availability.  This  latter  channel,  as  we  shall  see  later  in the  paper,  can
play  a  crucial  role  in  determining  the  macroeconomic  outcome  oF
different  fiscal  Folicies.  It  is  also  plausible  of  course  to  interpret  ths
joint  significance  of  credit  and  Interest  rates  in  eq.  10  as  implying  that
only  a  subset  of  firms  is  credit  constrained.  Finally,  by  putting
together  the  estimation  results  for  eqs.  10  and  11  we  can  argue  that
public  investment  bears  a  complementarity  relationship  with  private
investment.  Indeed  an  increase  in  public  investment  will  lead  to  higher
capacity  output  (eq.  11  and,  through  this  channel,  to  higher  private
investment.  By  severely  cutting  public  investment,  fiscal  policy  may
have  contributed  in  the  past  to  the  stagnation  of private  investment.
b) the  saving  decision
A  steady  supply  oF domestic  saving  will  ensure  that  a  sustained  rate  of
investment  would  not  be  incompatible  with  existing  constraints  on  the
external  payments  front.  It  is  essential  thereFore  to  gather  an  adequate
understanding  oF the  determinants  oF saving  behaviour.  Unfortunately  the
measurement  of  saving  is  beset  with  difficulties,  to  the  extent  that
consumption  is  computed  residually  in  Morocco's  national  accounts.  We
can  rely  on  two  alternative  measures  of  private  seving,  one  derived  as
the  difference  between  private  disposable  income  and  private
consumption,  the  other  based  on  the  saving-investment  identity  for  the
economy.  Because  of  statistical  inconsistencies,  the  two  procedures  do
not  yield  the  same  result.  In  what  follows  we  use  the  first  measure.  We
find  that,  after  peaking  during  the  phosphate  price  boom  and  declining
aFterward,  the  average  propensity  to  save  has  been  steadily  increasing
during  the  1980's.2)  L
'~  lthe  behavcur  cf  sa  \ing,  we  first  take  a  simple  permanent
acrroach.  Under  well-known  ccnditons  the  maximization  oF
inter4emporal  utilit'y  by  the  representative  consumer  %ill  Imply  that
aSgr-Fate  ccrnsumption  (denoted  as  C)  is  simnpl  equal  to  a  proportion  of
permanent  in-ornme (YR),  i.e.:
C - k  YP  (12)
Note  that  C  should  be  defined  to  inloude  only  the  consumption  of  non-
durable  commodities.  Lack  of  data  preclude  this  important  refinement.
For  estimation  purposes,  at  least  two  issues  need  to  be  addressed.  First
we  must  specify  an  indicator  of  permanent  income.  In  what  follows,  we
simply  regress  the  actual  value  of  real  disposable  income  on  a  time
trend  and  take  the  fitted  value  from  such  equation  as  an  estimate  of  YP.
Secondjlv  we  need  to  recognize  that  the  parameter  k  will  not  in  general
be Ficed,  but  will  depend  on  the  real  interest  rate  and,  possibly,  the  real
exchange  rate.  The  impact  of both  variables  on the  propensity  to  consume
is  however  theoretically  ambiguous.  Our  estimated  equation  reads  as:
A  ln Ct  =13  + .48  (I'n Yt - In C:  1)  ~ 17 r  - .044  In X
t  .12)  (.08)  (.10)  (.018)
R2 _73  W =2.25  SERP  .015
where  r  and  X  denote  the  real  interest  rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate
respectihely.  The  latter  is  defined  so  that  an  increase  in  X  implies  a  a
real  depreciation.  In  the  estimation,  the  restriction  that  the  long-run
eiasticitv  of  consumption  with  respect  to  permanent  income  be  equal  to
cne  has  been  tested  and  imposed  in  the  equation  (t14 =  .81).  Our
results  indicate  that  an  increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  and  a  real
depreciation  will  both  lead  to  a  decline  in  the  propensity  to  consume.
This  approach  highlights  two  channels  through  which  fiscal  policy
wE. affect  private  saving  and  consumption  behaviour.  First,  fiscal  policy
ma.  influence,  through  taxes  and  transFers,  the  volume  of  disposable
income  the  conaumers  can  spend.  In  this  framework  a  temporary  tax
increase  will  have  a  more  limited  eFfect  than  a  permanent  increase.
Second.  fiscal  policy  may  aFFect  private  sawing  bv  inFluencing  the  level
cF  irnterest  rates.  Our  estimates  suggest  that  an  expansionary  fiscal2 3
poIi'-',  '4,~i.  cr-,'~. iq ot  thr  :ush  the  intZFA  rte-  cha!nnel  .L-th  rcn!.-unmption
and  in.estmPnt  d-mand.  A  third  -hann,e  (n.t  allowei  for  in  the  previous
estimatesi  may  be  howe  er  as  v  ,-r  if  rati-na!  Fri'.ate  agents  takie fully
into  a,-count  the  future  ta<  liatijities  ass--ciated  with  bornd-financed
defic~it.  The  impli-cati-n  Is  tha'  a  shift  from  ta<  to  debt  finance  of  a
given  volume  of  public  e<enditure  should  be  neutral  insoFar  as  it  would
be  mat-hed  bY  offs`,tting  priaete  agents  behaviour.  This  is  because
private  agents  would  be  perFectly  aware  of  the  future  tax  liabilities  and
the  consequent  reduction  in  their  permanent  disposable  income  that  the
increased  deficit  entails  and  would  correspondingly  reduce  their
consumption.  This  is  known  as  the  Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis.
There  are  several  reasons  whv  this  pr oposition  may  not  hold,  among
which  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  possibility  that  private  agents  may
discount  the  future  at  a  different  rate  than  the  government  and  the
presence  of  capital  market  imperfections  which  hinder  the  intertemporal
smoothing  of  consumption  by  private  agents.  Evidence  on  these  issues
for  developing  countries  is  limited  (see  however  Rossi,  1988,  Nam
1989,  Haque  and  Montie!,  1989,  Deaton  1990  and  Haque,  1990).  In
what  follows  we  amend  the  previous  specification  to  allow  for  the
possibility  that,  by  reducing  perceived  disposable  income,  government
deficits  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  consumption.  We  do  not  expect
this  effect  to  be  particularly  strong  in  Morocco,  because  of  the  absence
of  a  consumer  credit  market  and  the  likely  pervasiveness  of  liquidity
constraints  on  households.  To  capture  this  effect  we  introduce  liquid
assets  (currency  plus  bank  deposits)  in  our  equation.  We  also  allow  for
inflationary  effects  on  the  ground  that  a  high  level  of  inflation  will  lead
to  capital  losses  on  liquid  assets  and  impart  a  downward  bias  to  the
traditional  measure  of  disposable  income.  An  increase  in  inflation
should  also  be  associated  with  greater  uncertainty  and  lead,  through  this
channel,  to  an  increase  in  precautionary  saving.  If  we  estimate  this
more  complete  model,  we  find  that:
A  In Ct  = .46  (In Y  - In C,_  )  +  .06  (n  Mt  - In Ct)  -. 09  In X
(.056)  (.02)  (.02)
-.12  A  In pt  - .13  (deF/(CODP)
(,07)  (.05)
R 2 =  83  DW  = 2.16  SER  .01224
V.hCFC.  in  standard  notation,  F  indicates  the  price  Ie  el  (so  that  A  In  p
appFroimates  the  inflation  rate-,  M1  denctes  the  stock  of liquid  assets  and
depf/GDP  indicates  the  ratio  of  the  budget  deFicit  to  GDP.  In  this
specific-ation,  which  closely  follcsv  Hendry  and  von  Ungern  Stenberg
(1981),  consumers  adjust  theIr  expenditures  to  ensure  constant  steady
state  equilibrium  ratios  of  consumptiun  to  disposable  income  and  to
liquid  assets.  These  long-run  equilibrium  ratios  are  affected  by the  level
of  the  real  exchange  rate,  by  inflation  and  by  budget  deficits.  The
significant  impact  of  budget  deficits  on  consumption  in  Morocco  may
seem  surprising,  but  was  already  found  in  work  by  Montiel  and  Haque
(1989)  and  by  Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Muller  (1990).  We  have  tried  to
assess  whether  this  efFect  could  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  government
expenditure  on  goods  and  services  substitutes  for  private  consumption,
but  the  high  collinearity  between  the  deficit  variable  and  government
expenditure  prevented  such  a  test.  Finally  both  higher  inflation  and  a
depreciating  real  real  exchange  rate  have  a  negative  impact  on
consumption.  The  real  interest  rate  instead  is  no  longer  statistically
significant  and  has  been  excluded  from  the  equation.  We  can  only
speculate  why  the  real  interest  rate  no  longer  seems  to  be  a  significant
determinant  of  consumption  behaviour.  One  possible  explanation  could
be  that  in  the  previous  specification  the  real  interest  rate  variable  was
actually  picking  up  the  efFect  oF  budget  deficits.  Indeed,  as  our  last
estimates  suggest,  a  larger  budget  deficits  lowers  consumption  and  Is
also  likely  to  be  associated  with  rising  interest  rates.  Overall  this  new
specification  appears  to  indicate  an  even  stronger  role  for  fiscal  policy
in  influencing  consumption  behaviour.25
5.  MODELLINGi THE IMPACT  OF  FISCAL  POLICY
A  comprehensive  analysis  of  fiscal  policy  requires  an  economy-wide
model.  In  this  section,  building  on  the  estimates  already  presented  and
on  previous  work  by  Faini,  Porter  and  van  Wijnber  gen  (1989),  we
present  a  simple  macroeconometrlc  model  which  will  then  provide  the
basis  for  an  evaluation  of fiscal  policy  In Morocco.
A  full  presentation  oF the  model  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper
and  can  already  be  found  in  Faini  et  al.  (1989).  In  what  fo.ows  we
only  present  a  stylized  description  of  the  main  features  of  the  model.
The  latter  is  based  on a  simple  variant  of  the  aggregate  supply-aggregate
demand  open  economy  framework.  Noticeable  features  of  the  model
include  the  emphasis  on  supply  behaviour,  the  modelling  of  import
demand  under  rationing  and  the  analysis  of  both  external  and  domestic
debt  dynamics.  The  presentation  is  organised  by  economic  agents
(firms,  households,  goverment,  etc.)  rather  than  by  the  more  usual
approach  based  on  a  distinction  between  markets  (goods,  labour,  and
money  markets).  This  should  permit  a  more  critical  evaluation  oF the
microeconomic  foundations  of the  model.
a) a  macroeconomic  model
Table  6  can  used  as  a  guide  to  the  maln  relationships  comprised  In
the  model.  The  first  block  of  equations  focusses  on  the  firm.  The
approach  used  to  specify  the  behaviour  of  the  representatlve  firms  was
described  in  the  previous  paragraph  when  analysing  the  investment
decision.  In  eq.  1  in  the  Table  investment  (I)  is  a  Function  of  expected
output  (Ye),  the  cost  oF capital  (c)  and  the  availability  of  credit  (B  ).
The cost  of capital  (eq.  2)  is  a  function  of tax  (,u and  r)  and  depreciatfon
(8)  parameters  as  well  as  oF  the  ILnterest  rate  r  and  the  price  of
investment  goods,  p.  In  turn  p  (eq.  3)  is  equal  to  a  weighted  average
of  the  price  of  domestic  (pI )  and  imported  capital  goods,  with  the
latter  depending  on  the  real  exchange  rate  (X,  defined  as  the  ratio  of
foreign  to  domestic  prices)  and  on  the  tariff  rate  on  domestic  capital
goods  (r  .).  The  specification  of expected  output  is  taken  from  eq.  11  in
the  textm'After  choosing  total  investment,  the  firm  decides  how  to
allocate  it  between  domestic  and  foreign  capital  goods  as  a  Function  of
their  relative  prices  and  of  the  extent  of  quantitative  restrictions  on26
imForts  of  capital  goods.  q1 (eq.  51.  Short-run  choices  can  be  be
described  as  fcIlows.  Output  Isupplv  (Yi  depends  on  total  capital  stock
and  the  real  e<-hange  rate,  where  the  latter  acts  as  a  proxy  for  variable
costs.  A  real  depreciation,  i.e.  an  increase  in  A,  will  boost  wage  and
intermediate  inputs  costs  and  lowers  supply.  Given  that  capital  stock
data  are  not  a,ailable  In  Morocco,  we  take  a  first  quasi  difference  of
the  origina'l  supply  funxtion  and  estimate  equation  6.  In  the  estimation
we  take  the  primary  and  the  government  sector  output  levels  to  be
exogenous.  After  output  supply  is  determined,  the  demand  for
intermediate  inputs  (M  )  and  the  supply  of  exports  (X)  can  be  simply
described  in eqs.  7  andn8  respectively  as  a  function  of  Y,  the  wage  rate
(w)  and  the  relevant  price  variable  (p  and  p  ).  We  do  not  however
assume  the  country  to  be  small  in  expoRnmarketX.  The  price  of exports
p  depends  therefore  on  exports  volumes,  world  demand  (WD)  and
foreign  competitors'  prices  (p*).  This  completes  the  description  of  the
firm's  behaviour.
Households'  choices  are  described  in  the  second  block  of  equations.
We  make  a  separability  assumption  where  consumers  first  determine
the  level  oF  saving  and  aggregate  consumption  and  then  allocate  total
consumption  between  domestic  and  foreign  commodities.  Aggregate
private  consumption  is  modelled  as  in  the  previous  section  (eq.  10).  In
the  present  version  of  the  model  we  take  the  seciFication  where  private
consumption  depends  on  disposable  income  (Y),  real  interest  rate  (r)
and  the  real  exchange  rate  ()\).  The  allocation  oF aggregate  consumption
between  domestically  and  Foreign  produced  commodities  is  described  by
a  simple  (constrained)  linear  expenditure  system.  We  allow  for  the  fact
that  a  subset  of  foreign  consumption  goods  cannot  be  freely  imported
and  study  the  impact  of  these  rationing  measures  on  total  Import  of
consumption  goods.  Our  approach  parallels  the  one  used  for  investment
imports  and  draws  on  Bertola  and  Faini  (1990).  As  with  investment
goods,  we  do  not  allow  for  any  rationing  effect  on  aggregate
consumption.  The  resulting  equation  is  highly  non-linear,  but  can  be
simply  described  (eq.  11)  as  stating  that  imports  of  consumption  goods
depend  on  total  consumption,  relative  prices  and  the  extent  oF quotas  on
such  import  category  (q_).  Eq.  12  defines  disposable  income  as  the  sum
of  GCDP, net  factor  irncome  from  abroad  (NFI),  interest  on  public
domestic  (GOINT)  and  foreign  (OXINT)  debt,  transfer  (TR)  minus  total
taxes  (Ti  and  monetary  financing  (MF).  Note  that  interest  payments  on
foreign  debt  (i  XINT)  are  already  included,  with  a  negative  sign,  in  NFI.27
Then  NFI+±CX1N  is  a  measure  cf  net  factrr  payments  from  abroad
accruing  to  the  private  sectc*r  (mainly  ',vorkers  remittancesi.  Finally
eq.  13  deFines  private  saving.
The  behaviour  of  the  gc vernment  sector  is  described  very  simply  by  a
set  of  accounting  and  technical  identities.  As  far  as  taxation  Is
concerned,  we  distinguish  between  trade  (eq.  14)  and  income  (eq.  16)
taxes.  Import  duties  are  estimated  endogenously  in  the  model  by
applying  the  relevant  duty  rate  to  imports  of  consumption,  investment,
intermediate  and  other  commodities.  We  also  allow  for  the  temporary
levy  on petroleum  (eq.  15),  which  was  introduced  in  1986  and  should  be
gradually  phased  out  over  the  next  few  years.  Information  on  the
revenuF  likely  to  be  generated  by  this  levy  was  provided  by  IMF
source-.  Finally  the  income  tax  rate  is  determined  r esidually  from
total  revenue  data.  Eq.  17  defines  total  tax  revenue.  Government
expenditures  are  also  fairly  disaggregated.  We  distinguish  between
government  investment  (eq.  19),  government  current  spending  on  goods
and  services  (eq.  20),  current  transfers  (eq.  18)  and  interest  payments
on  both  domestic  (B  in  eq.  21)  and  foreign  (XD in  eq.  22)  debt.  We
can  therefore  acccdnt  in  our  simulatlons  for  debt  dynamics.  The
accumulation  of  foreign  debt  is  determined  by  the  current  account
deficit  and  by  real  exchange  rate  variations  which  induce  a  capital  gain
or  loss  in  the  value  of  outstanding  external  debt  (eq.  25).  The  change  In
domestic  debt  (A  B  )  is  equal  to  that  part  of  the  budget  deficit  which
cannot be  financed  aroad  (eq.  26).  Simply  manipulations  show  that  A
B  can  be  also  expressed  as  the  difference  between  private  saving  and
pgivate  investment.  The  last  item  in  the  consolidated  government
Central  Bank  budget  identity  is  revenue  from  seignorage  and  the  inflation
tax  (eq.  24).
Government  revenue  from  seignorage  and  the  inflation  tax  is
determined  by  the  private  sector's  choice  of  assets.  Following  the
analysis  in  section  2,  the  demand  for  currency  (eq.  27),  for  demand
deposits  (eq.  28)  and  for  time  deposits  (eq.  29)  is  simply  modelled  as
a tf,nction  of  income,  inflation  (7r)  and  the  interest  rate  on  time  deposits
(i  ).  In  eq.  30  monetary  financing  (MF)  is  defined  as  the  change  of
narrowly  defined  monetary  base,  i.e.  of  currency  and  of  demRpd
deposits  the  latter  multiplied  by  the  required  reserve  ratio  (rr  ).
Finally  conditions  in  the  money  market  will  help  determine,  through  the
banks  balance  sheets  identity,  the  equilibrium  in  the  credit  market.  The28
sUm  of  demand  and  time  deposits  define  total  commerclal  banks
liabilities,  which  are  allocated  on  the  assets  side  among  compulsory
reserves  (R),  credit  to  the  private  sector  (B  )  and  credit  to  the
government  (B  )  (eq.  3 1  It  is  assumed  that  bnks  do  not  hold  free
reserves.  Crecgt  to  the  government  has  already  been  determined  by  the
governement  budget  constraint  for  a  given  current  account  deficit  and  an
inflationary  target.  From  eq.  (31)  we  find  that  credit  to  the  prlvate
sector  is  determined  residually.  It  will  In  turn  affect,  as  was
mentioned  earlier,  the  demand  for  investment.  Therefore,  as  clalmed,
fiscal  policy  will  affect  Investment  not  only  through  Its  impact  on
interest  rates,  but  also,  more  directly,  by  influenclng  the  availabillty  of
credit.
To  close  the  model  we  need  to  specify  the  equllibrium  condition  In
the  goods  markets  (eq.  33)  where  total  demand,  I.e.  the  sum  of
consumption,  Investment,  government  spending  on  goods  and  services
and  the  resource  balance  (i.e.  total  exports  X  mlnus  total  Imports  M)  3,
must  be  equal  to  aggregate  supply  (Y).  A  second  condition  relates  to
the  current  account  constraint  (eq.  34)  which  is  Identlcally  defined  as
the  sum  of  the  resource  balance  and  net  factor  Income  from  abroad
(NFI).  It  can  be  easily  checked  that:
Sp  + Sg - CA  = I + Ipub  (13)
i.e.  the  sum  of  private,  government  and  foreign  savlng  (the  negative  of
CA)  is,  in  equilibrium,  equal  to  total  investment.
This  completes  the  description  of  the  model.  In  the  next  section  we
shall  discuss  some  stylised  properties  of  the  model  whlch  will  then  be
used  to  perform  some  simple  comparative  static  exercices  on  the  Impact
of fiscal  policy.
b) simulating  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy
Table  7  presents  the  complete  model  In  summary  form.  There  are  34
equations  and  35  endogenous  variables  (33  left-hand  slde  variables,
allowing  for  the  Fact  that  Y  appears  twice,  plus  the  real  exchange  rate
and  the  real  interest  rate).  In  this  sectlon  we  present  a  number  of
simulations  on  the  impact  of  fiscal  pollcy.  The  common  assumption
underlying  all  the  simulations  Is  that  the  economy  Is  rationed  on29
international  markets.  As  a  result  the  financeable  current  account
deficit  is  given  at  each  point  oF  time,  I.e.  CA Is  exogenous.  Notlce
that  also  the  inflation  rate  is  exogenously  determined,  at  a  level  set
by  the  Central  Bank.  Control  on  the  money  supply  allows  the  Central
Bank  to  achieve  its  inflatlon  target.
As  in  the  model  by  van  Wljnbergen  (1989),  two  equllibrium
conditions  play  a  cruclal  role  In  determining  the  equlllbrium  In  the
economy.  One  is  the  goods  market  equillbrlum  (eq.  33  In  the  Table),
which  can  be  read  as  requlrlng  that  demand  and  supply  for  domestically
produced  goods  be  equal.  The  second  condltlon  Is  the  current  account
constraint,  where  the  excess  of  prlvate  and  publlc  saving  over  total
investment  must  be  equal  to  the  exogenously  glven  level  of  the  current
account.  This  condition  can  be  derived  by  comblnlng  eqs.  12-  13,  25-26
and  33-34.  The  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  Interest  rate  wlll  move
to  equllibrate  the  goods  markets  and  ensure  that  the  current  account
constraint  is  not  violated.
Some  further  observations  on  the  role  of  credit  constraints  and  the
interest  rate  are  in  order.  It  was  shown  earlier  how  both  these  factors
will  afFect  investment.  Suppose  that  the  credit  constraint  Is  blnding,
i.e.  B*<y  in  the  notation  of  sectlon  2.  Suppose  also,  but  only  for  a
moment,  that  investment,  and  banks  llabilltles,  are  given.  Then  an
increase  in  the  interest  rate  would  not  move  the  credit  market  closer  to
equilibrium.  As  shown  In  section  2,  the  composition  of  Investment
finance  (as  desired  by  the  flrm)  does  not  depend  on  the  Interest  rate  but
only  on  the  risk  premium.  However,  in  the  context  of  our  model,  the
increase  in  r  will  reduce  Investment,  until  all  of  it  can  be  financed
from  available  sources.  The  firm,  though,  Is  stlll  off  Its  notlonal
demand  for  credit,  being  unable  to  achieve  the  deslred  composltlon  of Its
investment  finance.  Desplte  the  exlstence  of  credit  constraints,  interest
rate  variations  still  play  a  role  In bringlng  into  equilibrlum  saving  and
investment.
We  pursue  three  simple  simulation  exerclces.  Column  1  In  Table  7
presents  the  base  solution.  In  the  first  comparative  static  exercice
(column  2)  we  study  the  impact  of  an increase  In government  spending  by
MDH 3000.  Foreign  financing  and  domestic  Inflation  are  assumed  to  be
unchanged.  From  eq.  26  in  Table  6,  we  then  see  that  most  of  the
financing  will  rely  on  domestic  debt.  The increase  in  goverment  spending30
v.11i  bcth  cause  an  escess  demand  for  domestic  goods  and  lead  to  a
derline  in  sa\wing and  thus  a  current  account  imbalance.  As  expected,  In
the  new  equilibrium  (cclumn  2  in  Table  7),  the  real  exchange  rate  will
appreciate  (because  of  the  excess  demand  for  domestic  goods)  and  the
real  interest  rate  will  increase  (because  of  the  fall  in  saving).  Growth
increases  somewhat,  but  the  impact  of  the  expansionary  fiscal  policy  Is
mostly  reflected  in  a  crowding  out  of  Investment.  Capital  accumulation
falls  partlv  because  of  higher  interest  rates  (whose  effect  on  the  cost  of
capital  is  however  mitigated  by  the  real  appreciation)  and  mainly
because  oF lower  availability  of credit.
Suppose  now  that  the  increase  in  government  expenditure  Is  financed
from  abroad.  We  model  this  by  assuming  that  the  current  account  is
allowed  to  deteriorate  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  increase  in  publlc
consumption.  The  outcome  oF this  simulation  is  presented  in  column  3.
The higher  current  account  deficit  is  equivalent  to  an  increase  in  foreign
saving.  We  would  then  expect  the  interest  rate  to  Increase  less  than  in
the  case  where  no  extra  financing  from  abroad  was  available.  This  Is  not
however  what  we  Find in  the  third  column  of  Table  7.  The  real  interest
rate  is  now  equal  to  3.7%  against  2.9%  in  the  previous  simulation.  The
reason  for  this  somewhat  surprising  result  hinges  on the  crucial  role  the
credit  market  plays  in  this  model.  What  is  ha.pening  is  that  the
possibility  for  the  goverment  to  finance  a  larger  pcrtlon  oF  its  deficit
abroad  reduces  the  pressure  that  government  borrowing  p  's  on  credit
markets,  leaving  a  larger  share  of  total  domestic  credit  to  the  private
sector.  Investment  therefore  is  not  crowded  out  through  credit  rationing
and  declines  less  than  in  the  previous  simulation.  A  larger  increase  In
the  interest  rate  as  well  as  a  more  sustained  real  appreciation  are
required  to  bring  equilibrium  in  the  goods  market.  When,  as  in  the
First  simulation,  the  government  higher  expenditure  was  financed
domestically,  most  of the  crowding  out  of  investment  took  place  through
credit  rationing  with  more  limited  effects  on  the  interest  rate.  The
difFerences  in  outcome  between  the  two  simulations  highlight  the  crucial
rcle  that  conditions  in  the  credit  market  play  in  determining  the  impact
of fiscal  policy.
Finallv  in  the  last  column  oF Table  7  we  consider  the  case  where  a
foreign  financed  increase  in  government  expenditure  Is  accompanied  by
a  process  of  financial  liberalization.  We  model  this  process  as  a
reduction  in  the  liquidity  requirement  imposed  on  demand  deposits.31
TABLE  7
The  complete  modell
a) the firms
(1)  1 =  j(Ye  c  B )  private  investment  demand
(2)  c  =  p1 (1-,p)  [r  (1-r)  + 6  cost  of capital
(3)  PI Pd Pdi  +  (1-$d)  (1+tmi)  X  invest.  goods  price
(4)  ye  Ye(w(_1),  c(-1),  Ipub(-1),  MS(-1))  expected  output+
(5)  MI=  M  1(1  Pdi/Pmi'  q1)  imports  of  investment  goods
(6)  Y  =  Y(  Y(-1),  1,  X, X(-1))  supply  of goods
(7)  Mn = Nn(Y,  W/Pmn)  imports  of intermediate  goods
(8)  X  =  Xs(Y,  px/w)  export  supply  of manuf.  goods
(9)  px  p  P(X,  WD, p*)  export  demand  of manuf.  goods
b) the  households
(10)  C =  C(Yd, r,  X)  private  consumption
(11)  Mc =  C(C, Pdc/Pmc  qc)  imports  of consumption  goods
(12)  yd  - Y+NFI+GDINT+GXINT+TR-T-MF  disposable  income
(13)  S  =yd  c  private  saving
p
c)  the  government
(14)  TM. =  r.  k  M.  import  taxes  (i=n,c,o,i)
(15)  TP  = tp  Y  petroleum  tax
(16)  TY  = t  Y  other  taxes32
(17)  T =  z  TM  + TP + TY  total  taxes
(18)  TR  = t  Y  transfers
(19) I= 1p  Yb  Y  public Investment
(20)  0 = g  Y  govt.  expendlture  on  goods  and  services
(21)  ODINT = idd Bg(-1)  Interest  payments  on dom. debt
(22)  GXINT = ixd XD(-1)  Interest  payments  on forelgn  debt
(23)  A Idd = A r  + A Tr  Interest  rate  on domestlc  debt
(24)  S  =  T-GDINT-OXINT-TR-G+MF  government  savlng
(25)  XD  =  XD(-1)  X /  X(-1) - CA  external  debt
(26)  A Bg - CA = Ipub - Sg  govt.  budget constraint
c)  the  credit  and  the  money  markets
(27)  CUR = CUR(Y,  Itd,  Tr)  demand for  currency
(28)  DD =  DD(Y,  itd ,  7r)  demand  for  demand  deposlts
(29)  TD =  TD(Y,  ltd,  ir)  demand  for  time  deposits
(30)  MF  A CUR + rrdd  A DD  monetary  financlng
(31)  Bp  DD+TD-(R+B )  credit  to  the private  sector
(32)  A itd  = A r  + A  Tr  Interest  rate  on tlme  deposlts
d) natlonal  income  fdentitles
(33)  Y = C+G+X-M+I+I pub--  TM  goods market  equilibrlum
(34)  CA = X - M + NFI  current  account33
Notes:
+  not  implemented  In the  present  version  of  the  model
Other  symbols:
\:  real  exchange  rate
r:  real  interest  rate
MS:  money  supply
q.:  extent  oF QR's  on  Imports  of type  I
EB 2 :  credits  to  firms
?  mj  foreign  currer.cy  price  oF Imports  of type  j
Pmj  domestic  currency  prlce  of Imports  of  type  j
Pdj  domestic  price  of  good  j
px:  export  price
r  tariff  rate  on  good  j
r:  corporate  tax  rate
w:  wage  rate
WD: world  demand
NFI:  net  Factor  Income  from  abroad
7r:  inflation  rate
R:dbanks  reserves
rr  =  reserve  requirement  for  demand  deposlts34
There  are  certalnly  beneficial  influences  from  a  more  competitive  and
less  heavily  regulated  financial  sector,  which  are  not  however  modelJed
in  our  set-up.  But  there  are  also  some  macroeconomic  costs  as  shown  In
column  4  of  Table  7.  The  direct  Impact  of  the  reductlon  In the  liquldity
requirement  Is  to  Increase  Interest  expenses  on  public  domestic  debt  and
force  the  government  to  rely  to  a  larger  extent  on  domestic  credit
markets.  The  consequent  decline  In  Investment  relleves  the  pressure  on
the  domestic  goods  markets  (Indeed  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates
by  less  than  In the  second  simulatlon),  but  does  not  mitigate  the  Impact
r-n Interest  rate  of  hlgher  public  spending.  Agalnst  the  long-run  benefits
n  financial  liberalization,  some  allowance  should  therefore  also  be
ie  for  the  macroeconomic  costs  stemming  from  a  further
.erioratlon  In the  situation  of the  government  budget.35
TABLE 7
Slmulatlng  the Impact  of fiscal  policy
base  run  domest.  financed  foreign  financed  financial
increase  in G  increase  in C  liberaliz.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
r  2.7  3.1  4.3  4.4
X  100  96.7  87.5  86.5
i/Y  18.4  16.1  16.5  15.8
BD/Y  -4.8  -6.8  -7.3  -8.1
l"  6.7  7.1  8.3  8.4
B p/Y  21.4  19.2  19.4  18.6
GDINT/Y  2.5  2.6  2.7  3.4
Legenda:  r:  real  interest  rate,  X: real  exchange  rate,  I/Y:  GDP share
of prlvate  Investment,  BD/Y:  GDP share  of  budget  deficit;  Y':  growth
rate,  B /Y:  GDP  share  of  credit  to  the  prlvate  sector,  GDINT/Y:
GDP sh&re of goverment  Interest  expenses  on publlc  domestic  debt.
Slmulatlons:
1: base  case.
2:  Increase  ln  government  current  consumptlon  of MDH 3000.
3:  as  in 2,  plus  a current  account  deterloratlon  of MDH  3000.
4:  as  In  3,  plus  abolition  of  the  llquldlty  requlrement  on  demand
deposits.36
6.  CONCLUSIONS
Morocco  has  made  great  pro  ress  toward  macroeconomic  and  fiscal
stabllity.  Yet  the  need  to  consolidate  and broaden  the  achievements  to
date  remains  paramount.  We  have  argued  In this  paper  that  even  the
financlng  of  a  relatlvely  unchanged  tudget  deficit  may  pose  major
problems.  It  is  unlikely  that  foreign  finance  wlll  increase  substantially
in  the  medlum-run.  Monetary  financlng  does  not  seem  to  be a  palatable
alternative  given its  highly inflatlonary  impllcations  (sectlon  3).  Flnally
lncreaslng  rellance  on domestic  financlal  markets  ls  likely  to  lead  to  a
steep  increase  In  Interest  costs  for  the  Treasury  wlth  a  destabillsing
effect  on  the  evolutlon  of  the  main  publlc  debt  Indlcators.  Our
slmulatlons  also  suggest  that  an  Increase  In  government  current
expenditure  crowds  out  Investment.  The short-run  benefits  on output  of
such  a  pollcy  may then be  outweighed  by Its  long-run  negative  Impact  on
growth.  It  ls  essential  therefore  that  the  commltment  toward  flscal
disclpllne  remalns  unshaken.  At the  same  tlme  a  determlned  effort  Is
requlred  to  Implement  an  effectlve  reform  In  the  tax  and  public
expendlture  system,  wlth  a  vlew  of  avoldlng  that  the  brunt  of  flscal
adjustment  falls  agaln  mostly  on public  Investment.
At  a  more  general  level,  we  have  argued  that  the  effects  of  budget
deflclts  cannot  be  measured  by  looklng  only  at  the  Impact  they  exert
through  changes  in  the  Interest  rate  on aggregate  demand.  As  shown  by
Blinder  (1987),  Bernanke  and  2linder  (1988)  and  Blinder  and  Stlglitz
(1983),  a  large  part  of the  Impact  of  flscal  pollcy  may  work  Its  way
through  the  credit  market.  An  expanslonary  flscal  pollcy  may
exac_rbate  the  pervasiveness  of  credlt  ratlonlng  effects  on  Investment
demand  wlth  limited  Impact  on  the  level  of  the  Interest  rate.  Our
estlmates  support  the  clalm  that,  even after  controlling  for  the cost  of
capital,  the  avallabllty  of  credlt  plays  a slgnlflcant  role  In Influenclng
the  demand  for  Investment.  As  suggested  by our  slmulations,  the  credlt
channel  In  turn  will  be  a  cruclal  factor  In  determilnlng  the
macroeconomlc  outcome  of  different  flscal  policles.  Flnally  we argue
that  the  Impact  on  macroeconomlc  equlllbria,  In  partlcular  on  the
government  budget, should  be a  relevant  factor  In assesslng  the speed  of
financlal  liberallzatlon.37
ENDNDT ES
I  F^r  a  seminal  contribution  to  the  emplrical  evaluation  of  the
relationship  between  capital  market  Imperfections  and  investment
decisions,  see  Fazzari  et  al.  (1988).
2  The  formal  solution  tc  the  firm's  optimization  problem  is  available
from  the  author.
3  In  the  empirical  implementation  of  the  model  only  manufacturing
expcrts  on  the  one  hand  and  investment,  intermediate  and  consumption
goods  imports  on  the  other  are  endogenous.  All  the  other  components  of
the  resource  balance  (mainly  exports  of  phosphate  rocks  and
agricultural  goods,  imports  of  food  and  petroleum,  net  tourism
receipts)  are  assumed,  in  the  present  version  of  the  model,  not  to
depend  on  price  incentives  and  are,  as  a  result,  projected  exogenously.
Some  of  these  components,  in  particular  tourism  receipts,  may  be
endogenised  in  a  new  version  of  the  model.  Simllar  remarks  apply  to
the  flow  of  workers'  remittances  (a component  of  NFI)  which  should  not
be  treated  as  exogenous,  but  should  be  related  to  the  level  of  the
interest  rate  and  the  (expected)  movements  of  the  exchange  rate.38
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